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Federal Home Loan Bank Advances and
Bank and Thrift Holding Company Risk:
Evidence from the Stock Market
Scott Deacle* and Elyas Elyasiani**
Using bivariate GARCH models of stock portfolio returns and risk, we find that
bank and thrift holding companies that relied the most on Federal Home Loan
Bank (FHLB) advances exhibited less total risk and market risk than those that
relied on them the least between 2001 and 2012. When we control for differ-
ences in holding company size, stock trading volume, residential mortgage
lending, and holding company type (bank vs. thrift), the most FHLB-reliant
holding companies sustain the aforesaid risk advantages except during the
crisis of 2007–2009, when they exhibit greater idiosyncratic risk. The latter
finding suggests that investors perceived the high reliance of the borrowing
institutions on advances as a sign of distress. Portfolios that consist of only
bank holding companies show qualitatively similar results.
Introduction
Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) serve as a significant source of funding
and liquidity for U.S. banks and thrifts. At the end of the second quarter
of 2015, aggregate loans made by the FHLBs, called “advances,” stood at
$592 billion (Federal Housing Finance Agency 2015). In addition, the FHLBs
help their members maintain liquidity during credit crunches. For example,
after the major credit rating agencies downgraded subprime mortgage-backed
securities in the second half of 2007, the total value of FHLB advances out-
standing grew by 36.7%, from $640 billion in July 2007 to $875 billion in
December 2007. This growth occurred before the Federal Reserve opened its
Special Liquidity Facilities and before the Treasury Department intervened
through the Troubled Asset Relief Program. The level of advances outstand-
ing surpassed the $1 trillion mark in November 2008 (Ashcraft, Bech and
Frame 2010). FHLBs raise money for their members with several forms of
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government backing, creating moral hazard that could lead to risky lend-
ing, if not properly supervised. The magnitude of the FHLBs’ operations
and the moral hazard created by these arrangements motivate the current
study. We examine the stock returns of bank and thrift holding companies
(BHCs and THCs) that control FHLB members to determine the association
between FHLB advance-taking and holding company (HC) risk. Total risk
(the volatility of stock returns) and systematic risk (market beta) are both
considered.
The FHLB system originated in the Great Depression, when Congress and
President Hoover created it to ensure liquidity in the mortgage market and to
facilitate home ownership (Hoffman 2001). The system initially included 12
FHLBs, each serving a different region, which were chartered by the federal
government but almost entirely owned and governed by member financial
institutions.1 Initially, membership was available only to thrifts, which were
the biggest residential mortgage lenders, but Congress enacted changes in
the 1980s and 1990s that effectively opened membership to nearly all U.S.
depository institutions (DIs). The strength of the connection between FHLB
funding and mortgage lending has since declined, as Frame, Hancock and
Passmore (2012) show, while the system has dramatically increased its mem-
bership and financing activity. According to the Federal Housing Finance
Agency (FHFA), system membership rose from about 3,200 institutions in
1989 to about 7,600 in 2012 and stood at 7,203 in the first quarter of 2016.2
Through a central Office of Finance, FHLBs issue debt on the global capital
markets. They then distribute this money to their members in the form of
advances or, in some cases, make their own investments. Federal legislation
grants FHLBs several advantages that reduce the default risk and increase
the liquidity of their debt. These include a line of credit for FHLBs at the
Treasury, eligibility of FHLB debt for open-market purchase by the Federal
Reserve, and a “super-lien” that gives FHLBs priority over other creditors in
the event of a member’s failure.
Some researchers have suggested that the organization and federal backing
of the FHLB system elevate credit risk, whereas others have challenged this
view, arguing that there are mechanisms in place to manage this risk and to
even reduce market risk and liquidity risk. Elevated credit risk may emerge
as a consequence of the government backing, because FHLB managers do
not experience the discipline of increased default risk premiums on their
1The Des Moines and Seattle FHLBs merged in 2015, reducing the number to 11.
2Data taken from reports posted on http://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/Pages/
Federal-Home-Loan-Bank-Member-Data.aspx. Downloaded August 3, 2016.
Evidence from the Stock Market 3
borrowings (Flannery and Frame 2006). Similarly, FHLB member DIs are
not subject to market discipline on advances, as interest rates on advances
do not vary with borrowing members’ risk (Stojanovic, Vaughan and Yeager
2008). The FHLBs’ super-lien also creates an additional burden on the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC’s) deposit insurance fund because it
requires FHLBs to be made whole before depositors when FDIC-insured
institutions fail or enter receivership (Bennett, Vaughan and Yeager 2005).
However, as Scott and Hein (2009 and 2011) write, FHLBs mitigate their
credit risk by requiring collateral on advances and have the ability to limit
advances to members that are too risky. Moreover, FHLBs are subject to
safety and soundness supervision, currently by the FHFA. FHLB emergency
funding, especially at critical junctures such as liquidity crunches, may also
help stabilize FHLB members. At the same time, emergency funding may
allow troubled DIs to continue operating in risky ways for too long or to
delay resolutions.
Empirical evidence on the relationship between firm risk and FHLB member-
ship and advance-taking is mixed. Ashcraft, Bech and Frame (2010) report
that, of the $235 billion increase in advances in the second half of 2007,
$42.4 billion went to Washington Mutual Bank, which went into FDIC re-
ceivership in September 2008, and $18.9 billion went to Countrywide Federal
Savings Bank, which was purchased by Bank of America in early 2008 after
several months of distress. In these cases, advances appear to have gone to
institutions that the FHLBs should have known were highly risky. Using data
for 1992–2003, Bennett, Vaughan and Yeager (2005) find that the ratio of
banks’ FHLB advances to total assets is positively correlated with the like-
lihood of an FDIC supervisory rating downgrade, reflecting increased risk.
Contrary to this, using matched-pair analysis of data from 1992 to 2004,
Scott and Hein (2009) find that banks that joined FHLBs do not subse-
quently exhibit significant increases in leverage, total assets growth or loan
loss provisions. Using regression analysis of data from 1992 to 2005, Sto-
janovic, Vaughan and Yeager (2008) report that after banks become FHLB
members, they exhibit economically significant increases in liquidity risk
and leverage risk. On the other hand, however, they find an economically
insignificant relationship between banks’ reliance on advances and credit
risk, identical probability of failure for FHLB members and nonmembers
and a negative relationship between reliance on advances and interest rate
risk.
In contrast to previous research that focuses on supervisory ratings and risk
measures taken from financial statements, we focus on the stock market’s
assessment of the riskiness of HCs that control FHLB member institutions.
We use a bivariate generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic
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(BV-GARCH) model of BHC and THC stock returns to estimate their risk
measures such as conditional variance of returns and market beta. We form
portfolios of HC stocks according to the degree to which the DIs included in
each portfolio rely on FHLB advances for funding. One of the two baseline
portfolios that we focus on comprises HCs that rely the most on FHLB
funding. The other comprises HCs that rely on it the least. Using data from
2001 through 2012, we find that total risk (conditional variance of returns)
and market risk (market beta) are lower for the former portfolio in each of
the three periods into which we divide the sample: prefinancial crisis, crisis
and post-crisis. These results, however, may have been influenced by the
relatively small size of the HCs that relied on FHLB advances the most, the
low trading volume of many of their stocks, difference in HC type (THC or
BHC) and the extent of their focus on mortgage lending. After accounting
for these factors, most of our results remain qualitatively intact. Specifically,
the results on market risk remain valid for all three sub-periods and the
results on total risk continue to hold in the pre- and post-crisis periods.
The notable exception is that during the crisis period the total risk of the
HCs that are most reliant on advances exceeds that of their counterparts that
are least-reliant on advances. This finding, combined with the result on the
market risk of these HCs during the crisis, implies a relative increase in this
group’s idiosyncratic risk in this period. This finding is remarkable, because
although one mission of the FHLBs is to curtail the liquidity risk of their
members during crises, the greater idiosyncratic risk among the heaviest users
of FHLB advances, after controlling for differences in mortgage lending,
suggests that these lenders were perceived to be especially distressed. We
find little evidence to suggest that the long-term nature of advances, which
could help banks and thrifts to mitigate risk, drive any of our findings, nor
do we find that FHLB funding gives banks an advantage or disadvantage
in the management of interest rate risk. In the next section, we describe
the hypotheses and the econometric model used to test them. The following
sections describe the data sources, portfolio formation, empirical results and
conclusions.
Hypotheses
Previous studies, discussed above, indicate that opposing forces drive the
relationships between FHLB-member DIs’ risk and their FHLB advance-
taking so that the net effect is an empirical question. If FHLBs’ policies
toward advances discourage risky lending by DIs enough to more than offset
the moral hazard that they possibly engender, we would expect to see the
parent HCs exhibit less risk as their reliance on FHLB advances increases.
We examine this relationship by estimating bivariate GARCH models, which
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permit us to test the association between HC risk and reliance on FHLB
advances as described by hypothesis H1:
H1: Greater bank (thrift) reliance on FHLB advances is associated with lower
total risk (the conditional variance of stock returns of the parent HCs).
Moreover, if FHLBs are cautious in their lending to members, they will avoid
making large amounts of advances to members that are strongly exposed to
market-wide risk factors, at least when the latter are not in distress. In this
scenario, greater reliance on advances should be associated with less sensi-
tivity to general market fluctuations and, hence, a lower level of systematic
risk (market beta). This effect can be strengthened if long-term FHLB ad-
vances cushion members against liquidity and long-term funding problems.
Likewise, if DI members of the FLHBs do not already hedge interest rate risk
through the market place (using interest rate derivatives, for example), long
maturity advances and interest rate swaps offered by the FHLBs could lower
these DIs’ interest rate risk. In this scenario, it is likely that HCs funding a
greater proportion of their lending with advances will be exposed to a lower
interest rate risk. Stock market data make it possible to estimate the portfo-
lios’ market risk and interest rate risk using two-factor models of portfolio
stock returns, with the two factors being the returns on a market portfolio
and a measure of the interest rate environment. This framework also allows
us to test the association between market and interest rate risk on the one
hand and reliance on FHLB advances on the other, as described by H2 and
H3, respectively:
H2: Greater bank (thrift) reliance on FHLB advances is associated with lower
market risk (market beta) of parent HCs.
H3: Greater bank (thrift) reliance on FHLB advances is associated with lower
interest rate risk (interest rate beta) of parent HCs.
During the third quarter of 2007, losses on subprime mortgage-backed securi-
ties initiated a panic in the market for repurchase agreements (repos). At that
time, DIs saw interest rates on a variety of their funds rise (Gorton, 2010). As
Figure 1 shows, the HCs in our sample dramatically increased their reliance
on advances in the third quarter of 2007, and the usage of advances remained
elevated until the second quarter of 2009. If FHLB advances are perceived
as risk-reducing by market participants and few advances went to high-risk
members, the negative relationship between risk and reliance on advances
(H1) is likely to strengthen during the crisis, when FHLB support is more
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Figure 1  Aggregate FHLB advances for HCs in the sample: 2001–2012.
critical to members. It also follows that, if the riskiness of FHLB member
DIs rises during the crisis, those receiving greater FHLB advances should
witness smaller increases in risk, unless they are perceived as being in a state
of distress by market participants. This point leads to hypothesis H4.
H4: Greater bank (thrift) reliance on FHLB advances is associated with
smaller increases in total risk (conditional variance of returns), market
risk (market beta), and interest rate risk (interest rate beta) of parent HCs
during the sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2007:Q3–2009:Q1.
A Bivariate GARCH Model of HC Stock Returns
GARCH models have frequently been used to study the behavior of asset
returns (see, e.g., Bollerslev 1990, Engle 2001, Bauwens, Laurent and Rom-
bouts 2006). The GARCH (1,1) framework, used in this study, models the
conditional variance of an asset’s return as a function of the one-period lagged
values of the squared residual from a linear conditional mean model (the
ARCH term) and the one-period lagged values of the conditional variance
estimate (the GARCH term). The conditional variance (volatility) of HCs’
stock returns measures the HCs’ total risk. The coefficients (betas) on the
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regresssors in the conditional mean equation measure the risk that investors
assign to various risk factors. GARCH models offer advantages over sim-
pler mean regression models because they allow the dynamics of conditional
variance to be modeled. Moreover, these models do not need to make the
restrictive assumption of normality of the asset returns as they are amenable
to alternative distributional assumptions.
A number of GARCH studies investigate financial firms’ stock return behavior
and the interdependencies of those returns. An early example is Song (1994),
which studies the market risk and interest rate risk of portfolios of DI stocks.
Elyasiani, Mansur and Pagano (2007) use multivariate GARCH models to
study inter-industry spillovers of risk on the stock returns of banks, securities
firms and life insurance companies (LICs). Similarly, Carson, Elyasiani and
Mansur (2008) examine the interdependencies in insurer stock returns within
a system-GARCH model. Finally, Elyasiani, Mansur and Wetmore (2010) use
multivariate GARCH models to study the equity returns and return volatilities
of real estate investment trusts (REITs), BHCs, THCs and LICs.
We employ bivariate GARCH models to describe the conditional means and
conditional variances for pairs of portfolio return series. The baseline portfo-
lios are formed according to the degree to which HCs rely on FHLB advances,
as measured by the ratio of advances to total liabilities (ATL). HCs relying
the most on FHLB advances go into one portfolio, called HIGH_ATL, and
HCs relying the least on them go into the other portfolio, LOW_ATL. Con-
ditional means of returns (Rit) for these portfolios, indexed by i (i = 1 or
2), are initially modeled using a two-factor model that includes the market
return (RMt) and the lagged interest rates (INTt−1) as the independent vari-
ables. The latter variable is lagged in order to avoid endogeneity bias, which
may arise from contemporaneous correlation of shocks to financial markets,
represented by the error term, and innovations in the interest rate. Market
return and interest rate may be interpreted as risk factors. The coefficient on
the market return measures, conditional on interest rates, the portfolio’s sen-
sitivity to macroeconomic fluctuations, which could have an effect on bank
or thrift cash flows. The coefficient on the interest rate factor measures, con-
ditional on market returns, the portfolio’s sensitivity to changes in the interest
rate environment, which could also be associated with changes in bank and
thrift cash flows because of the duration mismatches between their assets
and liabilities. As Bessler and Kurman (2014) write, over time different risk
factors impact financial insitution stock returns as financial insitutions adopt
different strategies for earning profits. Akella and Chen (1990), Song (1994),
Browne, Carson and Hoyt (1999). Elyasiani, Mansur and Pagano (2007) and
Bessler and Kurman (2014) find that various proxies for both market returns
and changes in interest rates have significant effects on BHC stock returns,
8 Deacle and Elyasiani
whereas other research has found a market effect but not an interest rate
effect (Elyasiani and Mansur 2003). The BV-GARCH model used here, thus,
includes the following five equations:
R1t = α1 + β11RMt + β12INTt−1 + ε1,t , (1)
h11,t = ν1 + λ1ε21,t−1 + δ1h11,t−1, (2)
R2t = α2 + β21RMt + β22INTt−1 + ε2,t , (3)
h22,t = ν2 + λ2ε22,t−1 + δ2h22,t−1, (4)
h12,t = ρ12 h11,t h22,t (−1 < ρ12 < 1), i = 1, 2, (5)
εi,t |	′t−1 ∼ t(ν).
In this model, conditional variances of the portfolios’ returns, h11,t and h22,t,
are interpreted as the portfolios’ total risk. Estimation of the model generates
conditional variance estimates for each trading day in the sample. We perform
t-tests of the significance of the differences in the mean conditional variance
of these two portfolios to produce evidence regarding hypothesis H1 (greater
reliance on advances is associated with lower total risk). Simultaneous esti-
mation of the equations using the bivariate two-factor model enables us to
use Wald tests of cross-equation equality of the two portfolios’ market and
interest rate betas (β11 = β21 and β12 = β22). These tests provide evidence
regarding hypotheses H2 and H3 (greater reliance on advances is associated
with lower market risk and lower interest rate risk, respectively). The condi-
tional variance–covariance relationship (Equation (5)) allows the conditional
variances (h11,t and h22,t) to change over time but assumes the correlation
(ρ12) between the two series remains unchanged over the estimation period.
The value of ρ12 is estimated along with the other parameters. The con-
stant correlation specification of multivariate GARCH models ensures that
the conditional variance-covariance matrix of returns is positive semi-definite
and, hence, does not imply negative return variances (Bollerslev 1990). We
assume the residuals follow the Student t-distribution, because the return dis-
tributions of some portfolios exhibit fat tails in some sub-periods for which
we estimated the model, particularly those that come from the crisis period
(2007:Q3–2009:Q1). For subsamples in which portfolio returns do not ex-
hibit fat tails, the t-distribution still fits, because as the degrees of freedom
increases, the t-distribution converges to the normal distribution. The mod-
els are estimated employing the method of maximum likelihood using the
optimization algorithm of Berndt et al. (1974). Initial values are taken from
estimates of the bivariate GARCH models using the simplex algorithm.
We estimate the model for three subsample periods reflecting changes in the
stability of the financial system and the role of the FHLBs in shoring up that
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system.3 Figure 1 graphically illustrates the aggregate advances for the HCs
during our sample period (2001–2012). The vertical lines delineate the three
sub-periods. The first period, the pre-crisis period, starts at the beginning of
the data set in January 2001, when FHLB advances data for banks were first
made available in the Call Reports, and runs through the end of the second
quarter of 2007. The second period, the crisis period, begins with the third
quarter of 2007, when news of mounting losses on subprime mortgage-backed
securities initiated a panic in the market for repurchase agreements (repos),
for which such securities served as collateral (Gorton 2010), at the end of the
first quarter of 2009. Ashcraft, Bech and Frame (2010) document an increase
in FHLB funding during this period. The third period, the postcrisis period,
begins with the start of the second quarter of 2009, when FHLB advances
returned to their precrisis level, and ends at the end of 2012.
Data
Because we use market data on BHC and THC stocks, our sample is limited
to banks and thrifts which are publicly traded. Market data present some
advantages over the accounting and supervisory data used in previous re-
search on the relationship between bank risk and FHLB advances (Bennett,
Vaughan and Yeager, 2005; Stojanovic, Vaughan and Yeager, 2008). Specifi-
cally, accounting-based data are backwards looking, rather than forward look-
ing, lack information about systemic or macroeconomic risk as determined
by expectations of future market movements, and are subject to “window
dressing” by managers who time the reporting of both good and bad news
through discretions provided by accounting rules. Confidential supervisory
ratings have the disadvantage of being unavailable to the public. Market data,
however, incorporate investors’ knowledge of economy-wide conditions, their
expectations for future HC performance, and information that HC managers
do not release in accounting statements, such as news that emerges after the
statements are released. In addition, by using HC-level, rather than subsidiary-
level, data, we avoid over- or under-estimation of bank risk that occurs when
HCs, often under pressure from regulators or regulations, shift assets among
subsidiaries (Ashcraft 2008).
We assemble HC stocks into portfolios according to their dependence on
FHLB advances. Studying portfolio returns offers several advantages over
studying the individual HC returns. Portfolios combine data from dozens
of HCs into a few assets that are relatively easy to compare. In addition,
3We would like to thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion to break up the
sample into three subperiods.
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portfolios smooth out sudden fluctuations, or noise, in returns from short-
term shocks to individual HCs, while allowing examination of differences in
behavior among baskets of different categories of HCs. To avoid domination
of the results by large HCs, we give equal weight to each stock in the portfolio,
rather than weighting them by size.
Stock market data come from the Center for Research on Security Prices
(CRSP) by way of Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Portfolio re-
turns (R) and the return on the market portfolio (RM), measured by the return
on the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio, include dividends. The interest
rate variable (INT) is the yield on the one-year constant maturity Treasury,
the data for which come from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.4 FHLB membership information is from the FHFA and is used to
exclude HCs that do not control FHLB members and, therefore, cannot obtain
FHLB advances, from the sample.5 Although HCs with no FHLB-member
subsidiaries represent a potentially useful control group, there are only about
1,255 observation on such HCs over the 48 quarters in this time period, with
fewer than 12 in many quarters. This is too few to form useful portfolios
for comparison. For commercial banks, accounting data are drawn from Call
Reports – from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago before 2010, and from
the Federal Financial Institutions Examinations Council (FFIEC) thereafter.
For parent BHCs, accounting data come from BHC (Y-9C) reports supplied
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. For thrifts, data come from Thrift
Financial Reports (TFRs) supplied by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)
for 2001–2009 and by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(FFIEC) for the remainder of the period examined.6 Data on THCs, which
did not file publicly-released regulatory reports until 2012, are based on fi-
nancial statements required of publicly-traded firms, compiled in the Standard
& Poor’s Compustat database. BHC regulatory data were matched to stock
market data using a listing of BHCs’ Federal Reserve and CRSP identification
numbers produced by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. THC account-
ing data were matched to CRSP data using THC ticker symbols supplied by
the OTS and the authors’ own research. In any given time period, HCs are
4Obtained in October 2015 from http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm.
5FHLB membership from 2009:Q4 forward is available from the FHFA Web
site http://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/Pages/Federal-Home-Loan-Bank-
Member-Data.aspx. Data prior to that were obtained via correspondence with the
FHFA.
6The Chicago Fed stopped posting Call Report data on its Web site at the end of 2010.
It continues to post BHC report data on its Web site. The OTS supplied us with TFR
data in the early stages of this study, before the data became more readily available
through the FFIEC Web site.
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The sample runs from 2001 to 2012 and includes 24,465 quarterly observa-
tions of financial statement data on a total of 968 HCs. There are 48 quarters
in the sample. Descriptive statistics for the HCs in the sample are presented
in Table 1. In terms of asset size, the sample includes a broad range of BHCs
and THCs, but mid-sized and large HCs are disproportionately represented
because they are more likely to issue stock. HCs in the sample reported total
assets between $65.2 million and $2.4 trillion, with a mean of $25.8 billion.
Aggregate advances held by all HCs in the sample ranged from $184 bil-
lion to $618 billion, depending on the quarter of the observation. Given that
system-wide FHLB advances outstanding ranged from $418 billion to $1.0
trillion during this time,7 firms included in our sample were using 44–61.1%
of all the advances outstanding, depending on the date. As noted above,
we measure HCs’ reliance on advances by their advances to liabilities ratio
(ATL). To obtain ATL, we aggregate the FHLB advances reported by each
of the HC’s DI subsidiaries and divide the sum by the HC’s total liabilities.
HCs in the sample have a mean ATL of 9.3%, a median ATL of 6.9% and an
ATL range of zero to 62.0%. Only 10 HCs in the sample report ATL greater
than 50% in a quarter, and the 99th percentile of ATL is 38.4%. We retain
all observations because our analysis is performed on portfolios that mitigate
the effects of outliers.
We form two portfolios, HIGH_ATL and LOW_ATL, according to ATL values.
HIGH_ATL contains HCs in the highest quartile of ATL among HCs that
control an FHLB member in each quarter. LOW_ATL contains HCs in the
lowest quartile in each quarter. We recalculate each HC’s ATL each quarter
and change the portfolio compositions accordingly. We include new HCs
when they appear in both the CRSP data and the regulatory reports. When
HCs fail or are targets in mergers or acquisitions, they are dropped from the
sample when they leave either database. There is no significant difference
between the HIGH_ATL and LOW_ATL portfolios in terms of the number of
HCs that drop out, so we conclude survivorship issues do not bias our results.
Tables 2 and 3 present annual statistics on selected characteristics of HCs
in the panel as a whole as well as those in the HIGH_ATL and LOW_ATL
7These figures come from combined FHLB system financial reports posted by the
FHLB Office of Finance on its Web site, http://www.fhlb-of.com.
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Table 3  Descriptive statistics on BHCs and THCs, annual figures (2001–2012).
THC (% of all HCs) Average Mortgage to Assets Ratio (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year All HIGH_ATL LOW_ATL All HIGH_ATL LOW_ATL
2001 24.7 63.3 21.4 41.9 46.4 35.5
2002 25.2 57.0 21.4 42.0 44.7 36.2
2003 25.5 53.6 24.0 41.7 42.5 35.9
2004 24.7 53.7 19.4 43.4 43.8 38.0
2005 24.3 54.2 18.0 45.6 45.5 40.1
2006 26.4 58.0 20.6 46.2 47.0 37.7
2007 27.1 52.4 25.8 47.4 50.2 37.8
2008 27.5 51.6 26.6 47.9 50.0 39.0
2009 26.4 50.7 24.7 46.4 48.5 39.2
2010 23.6 46.2 19.5 45.5 48.9 40.1
2011 24.8 43.6 22.2 43.4 47.3 37.5
2012 18.8 41.5 10.1 44.7 47.4 41.1
Note: THCs, mortgage to assets ratio. This table presents annual data on the following
characteristics of holding companies in the sample: percentage of the HCs that are thrift
holding companies (THCs) (columns 1–3), and mean ratio of 1–4 family residential
mortgages to total assets (columns 4–6). The figures are calculated from quarterly data
from Call Reports and Thrift Financial Reports filed by the HCs subsidiary depository
institutions, BHC reports filed by the BHCs and data from public filings by THCs
stored in the Compustat database.
portfolios, demonstrating how several properties of the sample change over
time. The number of stocks in the panel fluctuates around a downward trend
over time, ranging from a peak of 629 in 2004 to a low of 410 in 2012 (Table
2, column 1). These figures are consistent with the trend of consolidation in
the U.S. financial services industry.
We focus on differences in risk between the two baseline portfolios and how
these differences changed after the onset of the crisis. Since the portfolios
lose equal or nearly equal numbers of stocks over time, the increase in vari-
ance of returns that is attributable to reduced number of stocks should be
roughly equal and, hence, should have little effect on our results. Industry-
wide reliance on FHLB advances, as measured by the average ATL ra-
tio among the HCs in the entire sample, peaked at 11.0% in 2008, when
the FHLB system increased advances in response to the liquidity crunch
(Table 2, column 2). FHLB-reliance declined in 2009 as the Federal Reserve
and Treasury’s emergency liquidity programs went into effect.
HCs that relied the most on advances were smaller than those that relied
the least on advances. HCs in the lowest ATL quartile have total assets
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averaging between $33.0 billion and $107.9 billion, whereas the HCs in the
highest ATL quartile have average total assets ranging from $3.2 billion to
$8.8 billion (Table 2, columns 6 and 7). As we will discuss in more detail
in the section on robustness checks, the size difference may affect market
prices of these HCs’ stocks due to size-related differences in the likelihood of
government bailouts, risk-taking behavior, and zero-return observations. At
this stage, we note that zero return trading days comprise between 5.4% and
14.4% of observations in a given year for stocks in the HIGH_ATL portfolio
and between 3.9% and 9.7% for stocks in the LOW_ATL portfolio (Table 2,
columns 9 and 10). The differences stem from differences in trading volume
which may affect our estimates of risk measures.
Columns 1 to 3 of Table 3 show the percentages of HCs that are THCs. De-
pending on the year, between 10.1% and 26.6% of HCs in the lowest quartile
and between 41.5% and 63.3% of the HCs in the highest quartile are THCs.
Because THCs and BHCs operated under different supervisory structures for
much of the period studied, we will test later whether our baseline results are
robust when we control for this difference. We also note that after holding
steady for most of the period examined, the proportion of THCs in the overall
sample declines from 24.8% in 2011 to 18.8% in 2012 (Table 3, column 1).
This decline follows the passage of the Dodd–Frank Act (The Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010), which closed the primary thrift
and THC regulator, the OTS, in 2012 and placed thrifts and THCs under the
supervision of bank regulators (the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
[OCC], the FDIC and the Federal Reserve). Although acquisitions account
for some of the decline, some THCs switched to BHC status, perhaps be-
cause their managers believed that the new supervisory structure reduced or
eliminated the advantages of the THC classification.
Table 3, columns 4–6, present figures comparing the average percentage of 1–
4 family residential mortgages relative to total assets for the entire sample and
each portfolio over time. The figures show that the HIGH_ATL portfolio has
more mortgages as a percentage of total assets over the time period studied
than the LOW_ATL portfolio. The difference could affect risk measurements
because, regardless of a bank’s or a thrift’s funding source, investors may
have perceived residential mortgages as risky loans, particularly in the period
surrounding and including the subprime mortgage crisis. We will, therefore,
also account for differences in residential mortgage lending when forming
portfolios for robustness checks.
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics on the returns on the portfolios exam-
ined, including portfolios created for robustness checks. More details on the
creation of the additional portfolios are provided below. At this early stage,

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18 Deacle and Elyasiani
we note that Ljung-Box Q statistics were computed for each portfolio’s return
and squared return series at 10 lags (Table 4, panel 2). These statistics lead to
rejection of the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the return and squared
return series, supporting the use of GARCH models. Jarque–Bera tests for
normality, as well as calculations of skewness and kurtosis, indicate that the
return series are non-normal and skewed, further supporting GARCH model-
ing of the return series. Dickey and Fuller’s (1979) and Phillips and Perron’s
(1988) tests were conducted on all portfolio return series, the market return
series (RMt), and the series of one-year Treasury yields. The null hypothesis
of a unit root is rejected for all series except the one-year Treasury yields.
Hence, we use the differenced version of the one-year Treasury rates. The
null of a unit root is rejected for the differenced yield series, supporting its
use in the models.
Bivariate GARCH Estimation Results
The Two-Index Model, Baseline Portfolios: Total Risk
Table 5 presents the coefficient estimates of the two-index bivariate GARCH
model of returns on the HIGH_ATL and LOW_ATL baseline portfolios. Coef-
ficient estimates appear in panel 1, and tests of risk equality across portfolios
appear in panel 2. The model is estimated for three subsample periods: precri-
sis (2001:Q1–2007:Q2), crisis (2007:Q3–2009:Q1), and postcrisis (2009:Q2–
2012:Q4). Tests of the equality of total risk between the portfolios lead to the
conclusion that the total risk of the HIGH_ATL portfolio is lower than that
of the LOW_ATL portfolio in all three subperiods and that the risk-advantage
of the former portfolio widens considerably in the crisis period. These find-
ings support our hypothesis (H1) proposing that the total risk of the most
FHLB-reliant HCs is lower throughout the sample as well as our hypothesis
(H4) purporting that the risk advantage increases in the crisis period. The
differences in mean conditional variances are small in magnitude (fractions
of one percentage point). To provide an economic interpretation of these dif-
ferences, we calculate the differences in mean 1% value at risk (VaR) on
$1 million invested in each portfolio.8 For the precrisis period, the difference
in VaR is $764 (less than 0.1% of the portfolio’s value). This figure increases
to $38,486 (3.8% of the portfolio’s value) in the crisis period and then de-
clines but stays above the precrisis level at $19,070 (1.9% of the portfolio’s
value) in the postcrisis period.
8The 1% VaR measures the loss that would occur on a day on which the portfolio’s
return is at the first percentile of the return distribution, a one-in-100 “bad day.” The
return distribution here is defined by the predicted mean and variance generated by
the bivariate GARCH model.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Evidence from the Stock Market 21
The Two-Index Model, Baseline Portfolios: Market Risk
Next, we examine and contrast the sensitivities of the two baseline portfolios
to the market factor. If greater advances provide a greater cushion against
market-wide shocks, the portfolio of HCs that are most reliant on advances,
HIGH_ATL, should have a lower market beta. The Wald test statistics re-
ject, at 1%, the equality of market betas between the HIGH_ATL and the
LOW_ATL portfolios in all three periods considered, indicating a lower risk
for the former portfolio in all cases (Table 5, panel 2). Moreover, the gap
between the two portfolios in terms of market beta widens from the precrisis
period (0.22) to the crisis period (0.34) and widens slightly further in the
post crisis period (0.38). HCs that relied most heavily on FHLB advances
were less sensitive to the market factor than their counterparts relying on the
advances least heavily. This evidence supports hypothesis H2, proposing that
greater reliance on FHLB advances is associated with lower market risk. The
increase in the gap between market betas of the two portfolios during the cri-
sis period supports hypothesis H4, purporting a relatively smaller increase in
risk during the crisis years for the HCs that used advances most heavily. The
minor widening of the gap between the two baseline portfolios in the postcri-
sis period indicates that market fears about vulnerability of the firms were
sustained, or even slightly strengthened, after the crisis was over, possibly
because the chances of a bailout had declined and interest rates could not be
lowered further. In this environment, firms that were most reliant on advances
were perceived by market participants as being safer relative to those that were
least reliant on advances. Assuming a market risk premium of 6%, these gaps
in market risk translate to advantages in the cost of equity capital of 130, 202
and 228 basis points for the precrisis, crisis, and postcrisis periods, respec-
tively. These magnitudes are economically significant to an HC’s investors and
managers.
The Two-Index Model, Baseline Portfolios: Interest Rate Risk
Because they come in a variety of maturities, FHLB advances could help DIs
match the durations of their liabilities to those of their assets—if the interest
rate risk cannot be hedged in the market place at better terms. It can, thus,
be argued that greater use of FHLB advances may also cushion DIs from
interest rate risk if the maturities of advances are chosen appropriately to
hedge that risk. If this is the case, firms relying more on FHLB advances
would demonstrate less exposure to interest rate risk, as suggested by H3.
However, the evidence from our model estimates indicates that neither of the
baseline portfolios is significantly exposed to interest rate risk (Table 5, panel
1), and the Wald test statistics fail to reject the equality of the interest rate
betas for the two portfolios in all three periods (Table 5, panel 2).
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It is possible that both groups of HCs hedged their interest rate risk without
FHLB advances by using other techniques such as matching the durations
of their assets and non-FHLB liabilities. It is also possible that HCs relying
less on FHLB advances hedged their interest rate risk through the derivatives
markets, while those relying more on FHLB advances, which are smaller and
have a more limited access to such markets, hedged their interest rate risk
through advances, leading to statistical insignificance of the interest rate betas
for both groups. The lack of significance of interest rate betas of BHC and
THC stock returns is consistent with the findings of Elyasiani and Mansur
(2003), who use a similar model of BHC stock returns.
We further studied the interest rate risk of the BHC and THC portfolios by
using other interest rate variables. We obtained the same results when we
replaced the lagged change in the one-year Treasury yield with the lagged
change in the following variables: three-month Treasury bill yields, 10-year
Treasury bond yields, the difference in the 10-year and 3-month Treasury
yields and the difference in the 10- and 1-year Treasury yields. The last two
variables approximate the slope of the yield curve. To save space, results
based on these interest rate factors are not presented here, but are available
upon request. Low variation in interest rates may explain some, though not all
of these results. During the crisis and post-crisis periods, short-term interest
rates were close to zero, leaving little room for changes. Indeed, there were no
day-to-day changes in the yields for 34% and 26% of the observations on the
differenced three-month and one-year Treasuries, respectively, during those
periods. However, we obtained insignificant coefficients on the differenced
10-year Treasury yield and yield-curve slope series, but just 5–7% of those
observations were zero.
Because the model estimates consistently produced insignificant coefficients
on the interest rate factor, we excluded this variable and reestimated the model
for the baseline portfolios. As shown in Table A1, results for the baseline
portfolios are little changed. In these models the signs and significance of
the comparative positions on total risk and market risk of the two portfolios
remain qualitatively the same and our earlier results continue to hold. Given
the insignificance of the interest rate factor, we conduct the rest of the analysis
below with a single-factor model.
Robustness Checks: Controlling for Confounding Characteristics
The results discussed in the previous section may reflect differences between
the two baseline portfolios with respect to several factors, including HC
size, trading volume of stocks in the portfolio, HC type (BHC or THC)
and mortgage lending activity. To begin, the sizes of the HCs in the two
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baseline portfolios could influence investors’ forecasts of their cash flows
in two counterbalancing directions. First, the “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) HCs
may be perceived as safer because they are more diversified, have greater
access to hedging markets, and have a higher chance of being bailed out by
the government if they are in distress. Consequently, these HCs would be
expected to display lower total risk and lower market risk. Second, given
the strong potential for a government bailout, the TBTF HCs may become
bolder in taking risk. Another potential confounding factor that is related
to size is the volume of trading in the stocks in each portfolio. Small HC
stocks tend to have more days on which shares do not change hands than the
stocks of large HCs. Such asynchronous trading tends to generate observations
with zero returns (Table 2, columns 9 and 10), which could misleadingly
reduce the portfolio returns’ variation around their mean and reduce their
comovement with the market and interest rate factors (Campbell, Lo and
MacKinlay 1996).
In addition, as mentioned earlier, THCs comprise a substantially greater share
of stocks in the baseline HIGH_ATL portfolios than in the corresponding
LOW_ATL portfolios. The primary regulator of thrifts and THCs, the OTS,
was found by government watchdogs, politicians, and the news media to have
made serious errors in its regulation of large thrifts and their corresponding
THCs such as IndyMac, Washington Mutual and Countrywide (Applebaum
and Nakashima 2008; Treasury Department 2010). In response, the Dodd–
Frank Act mandated the closing of the OTS and transferred its responsibilities
to the OCC, FDIC and the Federal Reserve. If THCs were riskier than BHCs
in the time period examined, due to lax regulation and weak regulatory mon-
itoring, then we could expect them to pull up the risk of the HIGH_ATL
portfolio, offsetting some of the risk reduction effects of the FHLB advances.
In this scenario, the risk advantages of the HIGH_ATL portfolio are underes-
timated because of the higher frequency of presence of THCs in this portfolio
compared to the LOW_ATL portfolio.
The most FHLB-reliant institutions (in HIGH_ATL) tend to hold more mort-
gages as part of their portfolios than the least FHLB-reliant (in LOW_ATL.
See Table 3, columns 5 and 6). It is true that money is fungible, and ad-
vances do not necessarily lead to increased residential lending at commercial
banks on the whole (Frame, Hancock and Passmore, 2012). FHLBs, how-
ever, are historically associated with residential lending. For thrifts, which
operate under regulations that encourage residential lending, FHLB advances
may tend to fund residential real estate loans more than other types of lend-
ing. This means that during the crisis, which centered on residential real
estate, investors could have perceived greater risk in the HCs in HIGH_ATL
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because of their high exposure to real estate, rather than the source of their
funding.
To address these sometimes conflicting factors—size, trading volume, HC
type and differences in residential mortgage lending, we used a propensity
score matching procedure to form additional portfolios from subsets of the
sample so that the stocks in each portfolio more closely resembled each other
along these dimensions. (Details on the portfolio formation process and its
results are in Appendix 2.) We call the portfolios that result from this process
“matched” portfolios. Each stock in the HIGH_ATL portfolio has a corre-
sponding stock in the LOW_ATL portfolio with similar total assets, trading
volume and mortgage-to-total-assets ratio.9 To the degree the matching proce-
dure allows, the HC’s types (BHC or THC) are also the same. The differences
between the portfolios with respect to these factors are considerably narrower
than the differences among the baseline portfolios analyzed in the previous
section (see Tables A2 and A3). This reduces the chances that our findings
are driven by these confounding factors. We note that the matching process
does not narrow the difference in the percentage of THCs as much as it
does the other factors. To address this issue, we later analyze the returns on
another set of matched portfolios that include BHCs only.
The matched-portfolio results, reported in Table 6, indicate that size, trading
volume, HC type and residential mortgage lending did not affect the direction
of the findings regarding total risk in the pre- and postcrisis periods, although
it did affect them during the crisis period. To elaborate, for the matched port-
folios, as with the baseline portfolios, we find that greater FHLB advances
are associated with reduced total risk in the pre- and postcrisis periods, but
with greater, rather than smaller, total risk during the crisis period. In terms of
magnitude, in the pre- and postcrisis periods, the matched HIGH_ATL portfo-
lio, on average, has mean VaR figures of $12,829 and $31,586, respectively,
lower than the corresponding matched LOW_ATL portfolio, for a $1 million
investment in each of the two portfolios. The corresponding figures for the
baseline portfolio are $764 and $19,070. During the crisis period, however, we
observe a significant relative increase in total risk for the HIGH_ATL portfo-
lio vis-à-vis the matched LOW_ATL portfolio. In this period, the HIGH_ATL
portfolio has a mean VaR on a $1 million portfolio that is $4,981 greater than
its matched LOW_ATL counterpart. It is notable that HCs in both the high
and low advances quartiles relied more heavily on FHLB advances during
the crisis period, but investors seem to have elevated their assessments of risk
to a greater extent for the HCs that relied on FHLBs the most. This finding
9We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Evidence from the Stock Market 27
is an indication that investors considered the heavy reliance on advances by
HCs in the HIGH_ATL portfolio an act of desperation. Specifically, they may
have believed that these HCs used more FHLB advances because they lacked
alternatives and were in or near distressed conditions. As Ashcraft, Bech and
Frame (2010) write, markets for short-term borrowing were frozen during
the crisis, and six of the 10 leading recipients of FHLB advances during this
period either later failed, were acquired, or received “exceptional assistance”
from the U.S. government.
The gaps in market risk between the matched portfolios with the highest and
lowest FHLB advances are not as great as in the baseline model, suggesting
that some of the differences observed between the two baseline portfolios were
due to the confounding factors for which the matching procedure controls.
Converted to cost of funds with a market risk premium of 6%, the advantages
of the HIGH_ATL portfolio compared to the LOW_ADV matched portfolio
are 71, 31 and 77 basis points in the precrisis, crisis, and postcrisis periods,
respectively, compared to 130, 202 and 228 basis points found earlier from
the baseline models.
Taken together, a large increase in the HIGH_ATL portfolio’s total risk rela-
tive to that of LOW_ATL, and a narrowing of the gap in market risk between
the two portfolios imply a relative increase in the idiosyncratic risk of the
HCs in HIGH_ATL during the financial crisis. This difference in idiosyncratic
risk arises after controlling for a number of confounding factors, including
reliance on mortgages. We interpret this as evidence that investors believed
there was something particularly risky about firms that relied most heav-
ily on FHLB advances, suggesting they thought the FHLBs were directing
the greatest bulk of their emergency funding to prop up the highly risky
HCs.
Robustness Checks: Matched Portfolios of BHCs Only
When we use the propensity score procedure to match the stocks in the
portfolio, the difference between the HIGH_ATL and LOW_ATL portfolios
in terms of THC percentage narrows, but a significant gap remains. In the
baseline portfolios, the HIGH_ATL on average has 31 percentage points more
THCs, whereas in the matched portfolios, the HIGH_ATL on average has
22.1 percentage points more. We examine this issue further by excluding
THCs from the sample and forming HIGH_ATL and LOW_ATL portfolios of
size- and volume-matched BHCs.
For portfolios of BHCs matched by size, trading volume and mortgage to
assets ratio, we find that the gap in total risk is qualitatively similar to
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the matched portfolios including both BHCs and THCs discussed above
(Table 7, panel 2). Specifically, when THCs are excluded from the port-
folio, there is still a negative association between total risk and reliance on
FHLB advances before and after the crisis, but a positive and significant as-
sociation during the crisis. For market risk, too, the advantage of HIGH_ATL
over the LOW_ATL portfolio remains in effect during all periods. These find-
ings provide evidence that the results for the matched portfolios drawn based
on the entire sample of HCs are not altered in a major way by the presence
of the THCs. Given that the HCs examined are relatively small (averaging
less than $10 billion in total assets), our result for the crisis period indicates
that, in spite of the well-known troubles at Washington Mutual, Countrywide,
and IndyMac, investors did not perceive the “rank-and-file” THCs that relied
heavily on FHLB advances as riskier than similar-sized BHCs.
Robustness Checks: Matched-Portfolios of BHCs Only, Based on Long-Term
Funding
Our data indicate that HCs that rely the most on advances also rely propor-
tionally more on long-term advances than short-term advances. The opposite
is true for the least advance-reliant HCs. Table 8 shows the share of advances
that mature in one year or longer for all BHCs in the sample, as well as those
in the highest and lowest quartiles of ATL. For the highest ATL quartile, long-
term advances comprise between 62.2% and 78.6% of their total advances.
For the lowest ATL quartile, long-term advances make up between 25.3%
and 47.8% of total advances. In other words, the scale and the maturity of
advances are complements, rather than substitutes; they move in the same di-
rection. If long-term funding mitigates risk, then the results based on baseline
models may be driven in part by the long-term nature of the advances drawn
by the HCs in the top quartile of ATL, rather than advances per se.
We, therefore, form two additional portfolios with BHC stocks in the highest
and lowest quartile of the ratio of long-term funding to total liabilities (LTF),
HIGH_LTF and LOW_LTF. THCs are excluded from the sample because data
on the time to maturity of their liabilities became available only in 2011. As
with the previously discussed matched portfolios, the stocks in the portfolios
are also matched according to total assets, trading volume and mortgage-
to-assets ratio. We calculate the LTF values by adding each DI’s reported
advances, time deposits, subordinated debt, debentures, and other borrowings
that mature in one year or more and dividing the sum over total liabilities.
The exact weighted average maturity of the advances and other long-term
funds cannot be measured because data on liabilities are available only by
maturity buckets rather than exact maturities.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Evidence from the Stock Market 31
Table 8  Bank holding company use of long-term advances by year (2001–2012).









2001 60.2 76.4 25.3
2002 63.6 75.9 35.5
2003 63.2 73.4 37.1
2004 59.9 68.8 37.0
2005 56.9 63.0 39.4
2006 57.1 62.2 38.6
2007 59.2 68.9 45.1
2008 62.6 71.6 47.8
2009 63.1 72.9 45.0
2010 62.9 76.4 38.5
2011 64.8 78.6 33.1
2012 59.6 69.7 25.5
Note: The above table presents statistics on the percentage of advances that mature
in one year or longer (long-term advances) as reported by bank holding companies
(BHCs) in the sample. The percentage is found by dividing the sum of the HCs’
subsidiaries’ long-term advances by the subsidiaries’ total advances. The figures are
calculated from quarterly data from Call Reports filed by the BHCs subsidiary de-
pository institutions. The data in the columns labeled “Highest ATL Quartile” and
“Lowest ATL Quartile” are for BHCs in the highest and lowest quartiles, respectively,
of advances to liabilities ratio.
As we found with the portfolios of BHCs formed according to reliance on
FHLB advances, heavier reliance on long-term funding as a whole is asso-
ciated with less total risk in the pre-crisis period (Table 9). Although we
cannot statistically test the differences in the total risk gaps among the sets of
portfolios considered, we see that the total risk gap is smaller in the precrisis
period for the portfolios formed according to long-term funds than for the
portfolios formed according to advances (Table 6). This suggests that long-
term funding cannot be the sole contributor to the risk difference between the
two portfolios and reliance on advances does per se lower risk. This result
again supports our hypothesis H1 (greater reliance on FHLB advances is as-
sociated with lower total risk) for the pre-crisis period. In addition, heavier
reliance on long-term funding is found to be associated with lower total risk
during the crisis period, while it is associated with greater total risk for the
matched portfolio. Heavier reliance on long-term funding is associated with
greater total risk during the post-crisis period while greater reliance on ad-
vances is associated with lower total risk than for the baseline and matched
portfolios. This further strengthens our results on the risk-reduction effect
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of advances. The average VaR differences for portfolios based on long-term
funding are, in chronological order, −$9,674, −$20,362 and $63,399, com-
pared to −$12,829, $4,981 and −$31,586 for the matched BHC portfolios
based on FHLB advances. We also see a different pattern in market risk for
the portfolios of BHCs formed according to long-term funding. In contrast
with matched HIGH_ATL portfolios that fail to show an advantage or dis-
advantage in market risk, the HIGH_LTF portfolio does show an advantage
in market risk during the crisis period. Based on our test results and the
differential patterns of effects associated with FHLB advances and long-term
funds, we conclude that our earlier results on the matched portfolios formed
according to reliance on FHLB advances are not largely driven by long-term
funding effects.
Conclusion
After more than 80 years, FHLBs remain a significant part of the U.S. mort-
gage market. Their importance was exhibited again during the financial crisis
of 2007–2009 when they provided billions of dollars above their normal
levels of funding to U.S. depository institutions. An analysis of the volatil-
ity of HC stock returns, rather than accounting ratios, to assess HC risk
provides a new way to examine the impact of FHLBs on U.S. depository
institutions in the periods leading up to, during, and after the financial cri-
sis. We find that when we look at the pool of all stock-issuing BHCs and
THCs that control FHLB member depository institutions, greater reliance
on advances is associated with less risk. Between 2001 and 2012, a port-
folio of the most FHLB-reliant HCs consistently exhibited lower total and
market risks than a portfolio of HCs that were least reliant on FHLBs,
with total risk measured by the conditional variance of portfolio returns,
and market risk measured by the market beta. We also find that, consistent
with some of the existing literature, interest rate risk is not an important
determinant of the HC stock returns in our sample. We, thus, find no ad-
vantage in interest rate risk management for HCs that rely most heavily on
advances.
We conduct several tests of robustness of our findings. When we control for
differences in HC size, stock trading frequency, HC type (BHC or THC), and
mortgage-to-assets ratio, we find that while the most FHLB-reliant HCs do
retain their market risk advantage over the 2001–2012 period and their total
risk advantage in the pre- and post-crisis periods, they exhibit higher total risk
during the crisis. It appears that the HCs relying on FHLB advances more
heavily were perceived by the market participants as being exposed to sig-
nificantly more idiosyncratic risk during the crisis than those that made little
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use of FHLB funds. We also find that our results are robust to the exclusion
of THCs, believed by many to have been subject to weaker regulation in the
years leading up to the crisis. More specifically, a subsample of only BHCs
that controls for size and trading volume effects exhibits similar risk advan-
tages for the BHCs most reliant on FHLB advances to that observed for the
composite portfolios of BHCs and THCs. Finally, our results are robust with
respect to the long-term maturity of the advances. Based on model estimates
that employ returns on portfolios formed according to long-term funding, we
find that the longer term to maturity of advances weakens but does not fully
capture our results on advances.
While these findings do not provide an accounting of the overall welfare
costs or benefits of the FHLB system, they do provide some insights into
some other matters of policy debate. In particular, our main finding—heavy
HC reliance on FHLB advances is associated with less total risk before
and after the crisis but more risk during the crisis—can be interpreted in
two ways. One is that FHLBs acted, according to design, to provide liq-
uidity to the mortgage industry in a time of need. The other interpretation
is that the FHLBs acted to prop up relatively risky HCs. This latter ac-
tion, in turn, signaled a state of distress for these and other FHLB-reliant
depository institutions, in the eyes of the investors, reflecting the moral haz-
ard created by the government backing of the FHLB system. Our findings
with respect to the increase in idiosyncratic risk for the most FHL-reliant
HCs during the subprime mortgage crisis gives greater weight to the second
interpretation. Finally, although the OTS was criticized for laxity in its super-
vision of large thrifts and THCs such as IndyMac, Washington Mutual and
Countrywide, at the level of smaller, publicly-traded HCs and subsidiaries,
our results indicate that oversight by OTS may not have been significantly
different from other regulators—at least in terms of risk perceived by the
market.
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Appendix A: Baseline Model Estimate Without Interest Rate Variable
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Appendix B: Matched Portfolio Formation and Results
We form matched portfolios as follows: For each quarter, HC stocks in each
quartile are listed in order of their mortgage to assets ratios. Based on total
assets, average stock trading volume, HC type (THC or BHC), and mortgage
to assets ratio for that quarter, the Euclidean distance is calculated between
the first HC listed in the first ATL quartile and each HC in the fourth ATL
quartile for that quarter. The HC from the first quartile is matched with its
“nearest neighbor,” the fourth-quartile HC that is separated from it by the
smallest Euclidean distance. Each HC in the matched pair is then taken out
of the sample, and the process is repeated for each HC in the first ATL
quartile according to its position in the list. The entire process is repeated
for each quarter. Although the matched HCs have total assets and average
trading volumes near to each other in relative terms, in absolute terms they
differ significantly with respect to total assets in some cases. We therefore
exclude pairs for which the difference in total assets is greater than 25% and
form our portfolios from the remaining pairs.
Table A2, columns 1–4, compares the mean total assets in each portfolio—
baseline and matched—for each year. The matching process reduces the gap in
total assets from tens of billions of dollars to hundreds of thousands. Forming
portfolios from the matched pairs also has the virtue of balancing the presence
in the portfolios of “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) institutions. If a TBTF institution
is in one portfolio, an HC with total assets within 25% of its total assets—
and, thus, likely to also be TBTF—will be in the corresponding portfolio.
Table A2, columns 5–8, compares the percentage of zero-return observa-
tions on all of the stocks in each portfolio—baseline and matched—for each
year. The matched portfolios are considerably more similar than the baseline
portfolios. For the baseline portfolios, HIGH_ATL always has a greater per-
centage of zero-volume and zero-return trading days than LOW_ATL. But for
the matched portfolios, the portfolio with a greater percentage of either mea-
sure varies from year to year. Table A3 compares the baseline and matched
portfolios in terms of the percentage of THCs in each portfolio and average
mortgage to assets ratio. The average difference in THC composition of each
portfolio falls from 31.0% to 22.1%. The average difference in mortgage to
total assets ratios declines from 8.7% to 1.7%.
